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Abstract  
The still available in some jurisdictions offer of surgical castration to sex-offenders 
raises ethical concerns. The narrow castration law in Texas has found supporters since 
it does not mandate castration, instead reserving it for repeat offenders who seek the 
treatment. McMillan’s proposal views imprisoned sex-offender as competent agent to 
give valid and autonomous informed consent when certain requirements are met. 
Another major pro-castration argument asserts that compromising one’s autonomy for 
enhancing or restoring it in the long run can justify the non-consensual surgical 
castration. This paper challenges these arguments focusing mostly on sex-offender’s 
agency. The major point raised by this paper is that a sex-offender who is locked in 
prison, in all likelihood, is in an unhealthy (or quasi unhealthy) off balance state (from 
a phenomenological standpoint) and possibly he has limited human bandwidth and 
low self-esteem. Such a sex-offender could be unduly induced or nudged into consent 
to offered castration and this is a decisive moral problem. Besides, surgical castration 
is an intervention that leads to a situation which the person who request it has never 
experienced before. Therefore, the detainee sex-offender’s competence to give valid 
and autonomous informed consent to surgical castration is questionable. Besides, 
justice-related concerns are raised in case of offering surgical castration to detainee 
sex-offenders. Moreover, in author’s opinion the state might hardly offer surgical 
castration without pro-castration intention. Furthermore, this paper regards as 
questionable the role of psychiatrist as a guarantor of sex-offender’s agency and the 
effectiveness of surgical castration as medical treatment. 
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Introduction  
Sexual offences, especially when 
involving minor victims, are a 
significant public health and policy 
problem. Although the term ‘sex-
offender’ varies by jurisdiction here it 
is intended strictly. It is meant to 
include mainly repeat pedophiles or 
those who repeatedly committed other 
sexual offences equally chargeable 
from a criminal standpoint. When 
committing sexual abuse of children, 
offenders take advantage of their 
vulnerability. They betray trust and 
exploit children using their power and 
authority over them. Society and 
general public have every right to be 
particularly concerned and increasingly 
outraged at such offenders..Therefore, 
they exert pressure on lawmakers to 
introduce radical interventions such as 
surgical or chemical castration of 
repeat sex offenders to reduce their 
recidivism (through reducing sex 
urges) and protect children from their 
criminal behavior. Surgical castration 
may involve full removal of testes 
(orchidectomy) or removal of parts of 
the core of the testes (testicular 
pulpectomy).Sex-offenders may be 
offered voluntary surgical castration 
aiming at radical self-transformation, 
in order to correct their undesirable 
deviant behavior. The offer of surgical 
castration may be presented as strictly 
linked to penalogical purposes 
(voluntary alternative to further 
incarceration) or as wholly divorced 
from such purposes.  
In the past, sex-offenders surgical 
castration was broadly implemented. 
Over the past decades a downward 
trend has been noticed in the number 
of the jurisdictions that offer surgical 
(physical) castration, whereas an 
upward has been observed in the 
number of the jurisdictions that offer 
chemical castration to sex-offenders. 
Nowadays, surgical castration is still 
available in some jurisdictions as 
Czech Republic, Germany and the 
American states Texas and Florida. 
Importantly, in some jurisdictions, 
castration may serve penalogical 
purposes to a greater or lesser extent. 
When it is voluntary it may be 
presented to sex-offenders as formally 
alternative to further imprisonment or 
not. Even if not, often castration is in 
reality de facto alternative to further 
imprisonment. In the USA, as society’s 
awareness with regard to sex offending 
is at increase, nine states have since 
1996 enacted legislation authorizing 
the use of either chemical or surgical 
castration (or both of them), voluntary 
or even mandatory,  for certain 
detained sex offenders when being 
released back into community (Scott 
and Holmberg, 2003).  The legislation 
of Texas stipulates only (voluntary) 
surgical castration. Interestingly, the 
nine states vary considerably in how 
they treat sex offenders. There is a 
wide variety regarding offenses, victim 
age (e.g. <13, <17 or any). Some states 
fail to require psychiatric evaluation as 
well as counseling. Most of states 
require the offender to be provided 
with information about the side effect 
of castration (surgical or chemical).  
Most importantly, in chemical 
castration laws there is minimal 
consideration of informed consent. 
None law considers whether the 
offender is competent to consent to 
castration, according to the doctrine of 
informed consent. (Scott and 
Holmberg, 2003). 
In the twentieth century, a number of 
European countries have enacted 
legislation authorizing surgical 
castration for sex offender treatment. 
Although actually the practice of 
surgical castration has been abandoned 
in most European countries, in Czech 
and Germany relevant laws are still in 
force. However, the European 
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Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
heavily criticized surgical castration of 
sex offenders in these countries, 
especially Czech Republic.  European 
CPT (2009) stated that surgical 
castration unethical as being not 
medically necessary and deprives 
offenders of their right to reproduce 
and start a family. Besides, they 
challenged the effectiveness of the 
practice.  
It is noteworthy that in Texas, between 
1997 and 2005 only three sex 
offenders had undergone surgical 
castration (Harrison, 2007, 15). In 
Czech between 1998 and 2008, 94 sex 
offenders had undergone surgical 
castration (European CPT, 2009, p. 8). 
However, CPT has very recently 
praised Germany for ending sex-
offender surgical castration (between 
2013 and 2015 "not one single surgical 
castration had been carried out") 
although the relevant legislation 
remains still in force. 
Provided that in liberal democratic 
societies prisoners should not be 
viewed as less than moral agents, 
namely, as being reduced to non-
human status, the court-mandated 
castration proposed in Florida, 
California, and Montana raises serious 
moral concerns.1 Importantly, the 
narrow castration law in Texas has 
been considered more appropriate 
since it does not mandate castration, 
instead reserving it for repeat offenders 
who seek the treatment. 
In the relevant literature there is 
currently ongoing debate over the 
ethicality of sex-offenders surgical 
castration. Crucial point to be 
addressed is whether (and under which 
circumstances) surgical castration may 
be viewed as an effective medical 
treatment (in the broad sense) or, in 
fact, it serves other purposes such as 
retributive punishment, public safety or 
eugenics. Note, however, that in the 
recent history of humanity surgical 
castration has been used as a means of 
protecting the “welfare of society” in 
the name of eugenics. Therefore, it 
should be established that surgical 
castration is in reality voluntary and 
that what sex-offenders in reality want 
is to obtain their radical self-
transformation so that they can correct 
their undesirable deviant behavior and 
get back on tracks their own life that 
went badly awry. Moreover, it is 
crucial to be addressed whether the 
system views the imprisoned sex-
offenders as moral agents and if they 
are capable of providing valid and 
reliable informed consent against the 
background they live in. 
However, offering surgical castration 
to sex-offenders raises major ethical 
concerns. Recently, the debate with 
regard to the question as to whether 
surgical castration can be ethically 
provided as medical treatment for sex-
offender has been reignited. Professor   
McMillan (2014) has published a 
thoughtful, nuanced analysis on the 
topic, thereby provoking interesting 
responses among scholars. Indeed, his 
concern for sex-offender’s status as 
moral agent appears genuine. He 
exerted a great deal of effort to secure 
it as much as possible while keeping 
the practice in force. Therefore, he 
stipulated the ethical conditions that 
should be met for surgical castration of 
sex-offenders to be ethically 
permissible. McMillan views 
imprisoned sex-offender as competent 
agent to give valid and autonomous 
informed consent against the 
background where he lives. Besides, he 
considers that if surgical castration 
offer is formally divorced from early 
release there is not state’s pro-
castration intention. Further, he regards 
psychiatrist as an objective and 
unbiased evaluator of sex-offender’s 
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operant reason and informed consent 
process. More precisely:  
A) He places considerable emphasis on 
the relationship between sex-offender 
and psychiatrist. The request for 
castration should be initiated by the 
detainee. The possibility of early 
release should be intended by 
psychiatrist not to be the operant 
reason for the sex-offender to be 
castrated. Noteworthy is that many   
jurisdictions do not view sex-offenders 
as moral agent.  Under these laws, 
psychiatric evaluation lacks or has a 
superficial role (???). Therefore, 
informed consent is deficient. 
B) Consent to castration should not be 
coerced or induced, because castration 
is “…a permanent physical alteration 
with significant implications for the 
person concerned…”. The nature of 
intention is of great importance for an 
offer not to be coercive. 
C) Informed consent to castration is 
required from a competent sex-
offender. Information is meant to be 
inclusive of positive and negative side-
effects. For McMillan (2014) the 
approaches of Czech and Germany are 
not necessarily coercive. McMillan 
(2014) states that there is “every 
reason to suppose” that in these 
countries there is no coercion. 
However, provided that these countries 
adopt “security detention” for as long 
as required for “the protection of 
society”, one has every right to be 
profoundly uncomfortable with this 
assumption. Moreover, McMillan 
(2014) states that “castration might be 
useful for reconfiguring a life that has 
gone badly awry”. He states that 
castration may count as a form of 
psychosurgery as it can radically 
change the kind of person that a sex-
offender is. Thus, he can experience 
self-transformation, that is a real 
benefit. This, further illustrates why 
informed consent from a competent 
sex-offender is required.  
The requirements proposed by 
McMillan are said (according to 
McMillan himself) to be probably 
stipulated by Czech and German 
jurisdiction. Winslade (2014) remarks 
that McMillan’s proposal has already 
found its practical application in Texas 
voluntary surgical castration statute 
that meets the criteria set by 
McMillan.2However,McMillan’s 
careful analysis has received heavy 
criticism. Wertheimer and Miller 
(2014) regard the McMillan’s criteria 
as most rigorous and argue for broader 
implementation of castration, thus 
paying full respect to public safety. On 
the other hand, McMillan’s approach 
has been attacked as regarding the 
matter of sex-offender surgical 
castration as a less complicated matter 
than what in reality is. In this paper, I 
share this overall claim. Shaw (2014) 
attacks McMillan for stipulating less 
rigorous criteria than those that should 
be met for surgical castration of sex-
offenders to be ethically permissible. 
She warrants greater scrutiny. She 
proposes further investigation of what 
McMillan accepts with regard to 
state’s intention and its attitude 
towards the detained sex-offender. 
Indeed, McMillan’s conditions seem to 
strike an appropriate balance between 
respect for detainee sex-offender’s 
moral agency and public interest in 
(public) safety. Nevertheless, in my 
opinion, the conditions proposed by 
McMillanare ideal and only seemingly 
attainable. I directly challenge the 
admission of that proposal at multiple 
levels, focusing mostly on prospective 
castration seeker’s autonomy and 
decision-making competence.  A closer 
look at McMillan’s conditions led me 
to raise major ethical concerns about 
the attainability of optimal informed 
consent ritual which involves adequate 
disclosure and comprehension of 
relevant information and, finally, a 
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voluntary decision resulted from an 
optimal decision-making process.  
Besides, in this paper, I challenge the 
other major argument underpinning the 
ethicality of surgical castration: the 
argument from autonomy, based on the 
assumption that even if castration is 
non-consensual, it may enhance the 
future autonomy. Finally, I challenge 
the ethicality of offering surgical 
castration to imprisoned sex-offenders 
for another reason. I argue that a sex–
offender who is locked in prison and 
has chosen to undergo surgical 
castration, in all likelihood, would 
have chosen differently outside of 
prison. This threats the principle of 
justice.  
Therefore, I review some relevant 
literature that is consistent with the 
arguments I use to support my overall 
stance against offering surgical 
castration to imprisoned sex-offenders. 
 
The state’s intention: Is surgical 
castration a “coercive offer”? 
Although a coercive offer is offer 
(creates options as a genuine offer 
does, namely, is freedom-enhancing) 
and at the same time is coercion 
(removes options), the concepts 
‘coercive’ and ‘offer’ are not mutually 
exclusive. However, the understanding 
of the term‘coercive offer’ is currently 
controversial. There not a precise 
definition of the term. Indeed, the 
concept coercion is ill-defined. 
Importantly, the concept autonomy is 
also ill-defined. Various accounts of 
the concept ‘coercive offer’ have been   
mentioned in literature. Wertheimer 
and Miller (2014) regard as coercive 
offers (that can invalidate consent) 
only those unreasonable or unjust. It is 
argued that there is coercion in case 
that one leaves (by his offer) another in 
a position where he/she has ‘no 
reasonable alternative’. This condition 
has been interpreted in different ways: 
as great distance between the two 
options, as the fact that if one rejects a 
coercive offer leaves herself in dire 
straits   (unacceptable position),or as 
the fact that the individual who makes 
the offer knowingly takes advantage of 
another’s vulnerability(Wertheimer 
and Miller, 2008). According to the 
(broader)“rights-violating”  account of 
coercive offer there is coercive offer in 
case that one threats not to fulfill an 
obligation he has to another or to abuse 
(violate)the human rights of another 
(Wertheimer and Miller, 2014). Other 
interpretation considers a much 
broader sense of coercion which, 
however, may be justified when there 
are “sufficiently strong countervailing 
reasons”(Ryberg and Petersen, 2014). 
An offer that is coercive may not 
invalidate consent. In our everyday life 
we are faced with coercive offers. In 
the field of medical ethics are known 
issues such as the following: payment 
for research participation, payment for 
surrogate motherhood, payment for 
oocyte donation, and non-economic (or 
even economic in certain countries) 
benefits in return for organ or tissue 
donation. The relevant literature 
usually makes reference to the two 
well-known examples described by 
Joel Feinberg: The example of “the 
governor and the prisoner” and the 
example of the “lecherous millionaire”. 
In the first, a governor proposes “to a 
prisoner on death row that his sentence 
be commuted if and only if he agrees 
to be a subject in a medical 
experiment.” In the second, a 
millionaire offers to pay for the 
expensive medical treatment that can 
save a woman’s child if she becomes 
his mistress. In the example of 
lecherous millionaire he takes 
advantage of her misfortune.  
Between these coercive offers that 
invalidate consent and those that shape 
(but not invalidate) consent there are 
differences that are morally relevant. A 
coercive offer invalidates consent if 
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and only if it is ethically intolerable. 
And this should be assessed taking into 
account all the ethical implications of a 
coercive offer under the certain 
conditions. McMillan (2014) himself 
states that coercion may be justified by 
“weighty moral considerations”. That 
is to say that a coercive offer may be 
legitimate when there are ‘sufficiently 
strong countervailing societal reasons’ 
(as Ryberg and Petersen (2014) state). 
This is, indeed, an in-principle 
plausible consideration. However, 
further scrutiny of these reasons is 
required in situations with common 
morally relevant key characteristics so 
that if a coercive offer is viewed as 
legitimate for certain reasons, much of 
the same hold for any other analogous 
coercive offer (for the same reasons).  
According to McMillan (who, as 
Ryberg and Petersen (2014) remark, 
indeed does not goes in sufficient 
details into considering precisely what 
does coercive offer means) the 
intention of a state that offers surgical 
castration to sex-offenders play a 
crucial role in assessing the 
coerciveness and, hence, the ethicality 
of the offer. Lecherous millionaire 
intends the woman to make certain 
choice. The state should not intend 
sex-offenders to choose castration. 
Indeed, the state’s intention is morally 
relevant. E. Shaw (2014) requires 
further explanation of that assumption. 
She notices that the state is not entitled 
to intend (even if foresee) sex-offender 
to (be induced to) endorse the option of 
castration out of fear of further 
imprisonment, thus manipulating his 
body and mind. The state that views 
the imprisoned sex-offenders as moral 
agents should intend them to opt for 
castration for morally relevant reasons, 
namely, intending castration as a 
means of self-transformation (a kind of 
psychosurgery) that will enable him to 
become better, less harmful and trust 
exploiting human-being. 
At any rate, surgical castration, in 
reality, serves (primary or secondary) 
purposes such as those of public safety 
(prevention of recidivism), relief of 
general public anxiety for sexual 
offending. In addition, in case of link 
between castration and release, 
surgical castration may address prisons 
overcrowding and save public money. 
Therefore, even if the state does not 
officially intend sex-offenders to 
endorse the option of castration, in all 
likelihood it does it as a ‘second-order’ 
(deeper) intention.  
In my opinion, the offer of surgical 
castration to imprisoned sex-offenders 
carries an amount of coerciveness, 
since (as it is presented below) de facto 
(if not formally) it implicates early 
release from prison or at least a much 
better treatment in the correctional 
system. Moreover, it is crucial to bear 
in mind that even if a state has not 
formally intention of getting sex-
offenders to consent to castration, there 
may be a state’s informal intention of 
getting sex-offenders to consent to the 
offered surgical castration, provided 
that such a castration would serve the 
purposes of public interest (by 
promoting public safety and by 
addressing the overcrowding of 
publicly funded prisons and jails in 
case that the early release of the 
castrated sex-offender in the future 
cannot be ruled out). As a 
consequence, even if the offered 
castration is formally divorced from 
early release, the state may have a 
hidden intention of getting sex-
offenders to consent to castration. The 
practice of sex-offender’s surgical 
castration would be one that is 
intended rather than merely foreseen. 
This intention may be expressed 
through a variety of ways in which 
such an offer can be presented 
(verbally or not).  
The offer of surgical castration to sex-
offenders may be coercive to some 
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limited extent so that their consent is 
not invalidated. However, this mild 
coercion may play a crucial role in 
inducing sex-offenders to consent to 
their surgical castration, as is presented 
below in this paper. Moreover, it is to 
be highlighted that in a democratic 
society even a mild coerciveness (or 
nudging or undue inducement) is 
morally implausible when it comes 
from the state. The state (especially a 
communitarian-oriented state where 
solidarity has enhanced role) has the 
responsibility to protect its citizens 
from their self, namely, self-abrogation 
(i.e. euthanasia) or posing themselves 
to high risk (i.e. by participating in a 
highly risky research), at least without 
a free, reflective, fully informed, well-
balanced and responsible decision. 
This responsibility is further enhanced 
when it comes to prisoners to the 
extent that they are viewed as 
vulnerable population. This special 
responsibility is based on a range of 
reasons among which power disparity, 
detainee’s vulnerability, duty of 
detainees’ supervision. 
 
Focusing on agency and decision-
making capacity  
Testicles are highly valuable organs 
(with intrinsic value)  and have 
powerful role in construction of 
(bodily) self, sense of manhood and 
development of social relationships 
related to gender identity, sexual 
activity and reproduction. 
These organs constitute an important 
part of self (phenomenologically 
conceived) because they are organs of 
high visibility (internal and external) 
and symbolic value (Svenaeus, 
2012).The psychological need for 
implantation of plastic testicles in men 
that underwent orchidectomy for 
medical reasons is indicative of the 
symbolic value of testicles. With their 
endocrine function (testosterone 
production), testicles determine both 
the secondary gender characteristics as 
well as sexual urge, desire and penile 
erection. According to Elson’s (2003) 
theory the proportion of ovarian tissue 
in a woman’s body corresponds to her 
sense of womanhood. In all likelihood 
the same holds for testicles which may 
be thought of as being corresponding 
to one’s sense of manhood, given that 
testicles as opposed to ovaries are 
visible bodily parts with high symbolic 
value. Testicles play a powerful role in 
social (and particularly sexual) 
relationships as well as awareness of 
one’s own (bodily) self.  
Surgical castration is a radical 
intervention that causes a highly 
important permanent (irreversible) 
alteration of human body. Surgical 
castration abrogates a highly valuable 
(both symbolically and functionally) 
part of human body, which is essential 
for achieving both subjective and 
relational well-being through 
individual entertainment, establishing 
sexual relationships, reproduce and 
having sexual intercourse as a part of 
marital relationship, in short, starting a 
family. Note, that according to holistic 
accounts of health, well-being is hardly 
distinguished from health.  Healthy is
an individual with abilities (or 
capabilities) for (or striving for) 
achieving certain goals (Nordenfelt, 
1995; Venkatapuram, 2013) 
considered essential for leading a 
‘minimally decent life’ (Nussbaum, 
2006; Sen, 2009), such as to reproduce, 
to start a family, and to have sexual 
relationships and intra-personal 
relationships with others. According to 
Richman’s theory of “embedded 
instrumentalism”, health is broadly 
viewed as a matching between one’s 
abilities “qua organism” and goals 
“qua person” (Richman, 2004). On the 
other hand, it is said that surgical 
castration can get back onto tracks a 
life that has gone “badly awry”, that is, 
a healthy state (holistically understood) 
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restoration.  In principle, it seems 
counterintuitive and contrary to 
common-sense morality (namely, a 
pre-philosophical description of 
morality that people exercise day-to-
day) to abrogate a highly valuable 
bodily part for non-medical reasons 
(namely, for moral reasons). 
Notwithstanding, in the context of 
political liberalism it could be justified 
by a perfectly autonomous decision 
which, however, is an illusion. 
If autonomy is conceived according to 
purely proceduralist accounts of it, a 
sex-offender lacks the ability to be 
autonomous since there is 
inconsistency between first- and 
second-order autonomy and 
authenticity is questionable. According 
to Frankfurt (1988) second-order 
desires are formed through reflection 
on their first-order desires. The 
capacity for rational evaluation of first-
order desires is expressive of agents’ 
freedom of will.  As Fischer (2012) 
who shares the consideration that 
autonomy is self-governance states, 
‘the more robust notion of autonomy is 
inconsistent with weakness of the 
will.’  According to Dworkin (2015) 
when a person identifies with the 
influences that motivate him or her to 
endorse his or her first-order desire is 
autonomous. A sex-offender that is 
autonomous as regards the surgical 
castration should be well placed to 
possess freedom of will to identify 
with the influences that motivate him 
to consent to such an important and 
permanent bodily alteration. That is to 
say that he should be a strong-willed 
agent. 
The way to obtain self-transformation 
passes through castration since the 
latter is an ingredient of the former. 
According to political (not 
comprehensive) liberalism one’s 
second-order autonomous choice may 
involve alienating of one’s first-order 
autonomy.(Chambers, 2004). Second-
order autonomous is one who  
”actively and willingly” chooses one’s 
way of life free from compulsions or 
influences which would “obscure” that 
choice (Chambers, 2004). According 
to Rawls this is one’s ability to frame, 
revise and pursue their conception of 
good (Rawls, 2001, p. 19). First-order 
autonomy refers to one’s attitude to the 
rules and norms which are part of a 
way of life. Nussbaum (1999) says that 
within political liberalism people may 
lead non-liberal life as long as there is 
no coercion. Nevertheless, it is raised 
the question whether the not coerced 
second-order autonomous decision of a 
given sex-offender to become a self-
transformed(thus becoming a better 
person) is autonomous to the extent 
that it might justify the alienation of 
first-order non-autonomous choices 
involving the abrogation of highly 
valuable bodily parts of one’s self (for 
moral reasons).  Therefore, it should be 
guaranteed by over-rigorous scrutiny 
that a given imprisoned sex-offender is 
(descriptively) capable of making 
autonomous decisions in the 
preposition of seeking surgical 
castration. It is not sufficient to 
establish that he should be 
(normatively) capable of making such 
decisions. Treating the rigorous and 
complex process of decision-making as 
easily assessable and evaluable process 
may miss a range of important 
complexities that go along with a 
decision-making process. These 
complexities should not be overlooked 
when consent is given to a radical 
intervention which involves a most 
particular bodily loss for moral 
reasons. 
When offering surgical castration to an 
imprisoned sex-offender, his status as 
moral agent as well as his decision-
making capacity may be profoundly 
affected by a number of conditions that 
I illustrate below. Ethical concerns are 
raised as long as these conditions may 
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negatively influence the imprisoned 
sex-offender’s agency and decision-
making capacity to the extent that his 
consent may be invalidated. Informed 
consent requires both absence of 
coercion and rational/moral decision-
making competence. Imprisoned sex-
offender’s agency and decision-making 
capacity seem to be in   question, at 
least in the particular proposition 
which involves a specific and 
important loss for non-medical (in the 
strict sense of the term) reasons. 
Nevertheless, even if moral agency and 
decision-making capacity are not 
influenced so profoundly, in all 
likelihood, these influences may raise 
social justice-related ethical concerns. 
These conditions may threaten the 
principle of social justice in terms of 
the sex-offenders’ equal treatment 
inside and outside the prison, provided 
that the offer of surgical castration is 
(formally) completely divorced from 
the punishment of the sex-offender. 
Below, I elaborate on the points 
anticipated above. Therefore, I review 
some relevant literature that is 
consistent with my arguments. 
 
Autonomy 
Deviant sexual urges (impulses) that 
are intrusive and irresistible may 
seriously qualify as impediments to 
sex-offender’s current autonomy on 
any account of it. Some sex-offenders 
may be in effect, “passive bystanders” 
to their own motives whose power 
cannot really be attributed to them 
themselves. If will means the ability to 
act otherwise, they are merely weak-
willed and as such not self-governing 
agents. These urges may decrease 
autonomy as being alien to sex-
offender’s authentic self (from the 
authenticity-based account of 
autonomy) or be irrational or cannot be 
reflectively endorsed (from the rational 
account of autonomy). (Douglas et al 
2013; Bomann-Larsen 2013). Of 
course, autonomy is not an ‘all or 
nothing’ conception. Certain categories 
of persons (i.e. drug dependent persons 
or sex-offenders) may not be able to 
make autonomous decisions in certain 
prepositions but may retain their 
autonomy in other prepositions. Hence, 
deviant sexual impulses may qualify as 
impediments to sex-offenders’ current 
autonomy only in deciding whether to 
abuse or not, but not whether to 
eliminate his criminal disposition by 
means of surgical castration or not. 
However, I raise concerns regarding 
the autonomous consent to offered 
surgical castration.  
First the desire for castration may not 
be authentic (autonomous) decision. It 
is needed to be empirically searched 
whether the salience of repeat sex-
offending may cause pro-social 
impulses (such as to render himself 
innocuous for society)as well as 
intrinsic motivations for protecting 
sex-offender’s own coherent identity 
(through radical self-transformation), 
at the expense of his true wills and 
motivations. In some cases, a sex-
offender may be intrinsically 
(intuitively) motivated to self-
punishment. 
Second. Even if the offer of castration 
to detainee sex-offenders is not 
coercive, namely, does not cause them 
to feel that they have no reasonable 
alternative but to participate, it may be 
perceived (by some sex-offenders) as 
nudge or undue (soft) inducement. 
Indeed, the offering of surgical 
castration to sex-offenders may act as a 
nudge into accepting it, or not. Such an 
offer may be perceived (even if it is 
not presented so) as default option, 
namely, a non-argumentative influence 
on sex-offender’s agency and decision-
making process, which is instrumental 
in nudging sex-offenders into giving 
their consent to surgical castration.  I 
explain why. Sex-offenders who are 
offered surgical castration may 
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intrinsically be motivated to undergo 
castration hoping to get early release 
from prison, given the truth of the 
following assumptions: a) our 
experiences may influence our 
automatic thinking(Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009) and that people store 
schemata in their conscious brain 
which contain both rules learned 
before and the essential features of 
situations experienced before (Reason, 
1990), b) even if castration is formally 
divorced from early release, in all 
likelihood castration is de facto linked 
to early release from prison. Offering 
surgical castration to sex-offender is 
most likely to cultivate in his mind the 
hope of early release even if formally 
surgical castration is not presented as 
alternative to further imprisonment (or 
re-imprisonment) (Douglas et al, 
2013).Surgical castration may factor in 
as de facto alternative to further 
imprisonment. Provided that in light of 
modern penological theories the 
mission of the correctional system is 
rather to protect the community and 
rehabilitate the offender rather than to 
punish, it is reasonable that the 
threshold for incarcerating a non-
castrated sex-offender is plausibly 
much higher than it is for a sex-
offender who has undergone radical 
(surgical) castration. The legal system 
‘in a context where there is a radical 
disparity in power and vulnerability’ 
(McMillan, 2014) may make a 
straightforward threat of the type 
‘accept the castration or you will not 
be released’ or an (subtly different 
from this statement) offer of the type 
‘if you do this there is, as we both 
know, a greater chance that you will be 
released.’ (McMillan, 2014).Bomann-
Larsen regarded such an offer as 
wrong because it “fails to accord a 
human-being the moral respect they 
deserve”. Besides, c)offering surgical 
castration may be perceived as a preset 
selection of an option offered by the 
system (default option), namely, as an 
option to become a better person and 
get the life that went badly awry back 
on tracks, even if there is no intention 
of the state to do so. The moral reasons 
(becoming a better person) seems to be 
viewed by the system so important that 
might justify such a radical, permanent 
and important alteration of human 
body. In that case, the offer of surgical 
castration may cultivate in a detainee 
sex-offender a desire for conformity to 
his socio-cultural environment, thus 
nudging him into accepting castration.  
Although in our western type 
communities are characterized by 
individualism and relativism there is 
strong consensus concerning the 
disapproval of sex-offending behavior 
(particularly when involving children). 
(McAlinden, 2005).When such a 
strong social rejection is highly 
internalized (thus becoming internal 
stressor, proximal and strongly related 
to self) it may be a predisposing factor 
for decreasing self-
acceptance/esteem/trust and increasing 
self-disgust and self contempt. Sex-
offenders may judge the sources of 
rejection as in themselves. This is the 
case with internalized body shaming 
(Gilbert, Miles, 2014, 56) and 
homonegativity(Berg, Munthe-Kaas 
and Ross, 2016) and in all likelihood 
this might also be the case with 
rejection of sex-offenders’ behavior. 
Hence, internalized social rejection as 
well as possibly feelings of guilt and 
regret are factors predisposing an agent 
(sex-offender) into having less than 
robust moral agency (at least on the 
authenticity-based account of 
autonomy). Self-
trust/esteem/acceptance are skills that 
are essential for developing and 
maintaining authentic self and 
autonomy (McLeod, 2002).Without 
robust self-trust/esteem/acceptance the 
sex-offender’s status as an autonomous 
agent may be sacrificed. 
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The eventually internalized social 
rejection, along with the eventual off-
balance (phenomenologically 
understood, as is presented below in 
this paper) state of a detainee sex-
offender whosemind probably is 
overwhelmed by negative thoughts 
related to his previous criminal 
behavior, which may result in detainee 
sex-offenders having feeling ashamed 
and guilty, may lead them to make 
unreflective decisions, namely, 
decisions that result from non-
argumentative reason-bypassing 
processes. In some cases, the deviant 
impulses may cause sex-offenders to 
see anything through the lens of these 
impulses which thereby may take up 
and severely limit sex-offender’s 
human bandwidth. Offering surgical 
castration to an imprisoned sex-
offenderis made against a background 
that in some cases if not always is 
coercive andin most casesis directly 
threatening (as elsewhere in this paper 
is presented)to harm detainee’s health 
and well-being. Therefore, it carries an 
amount of non-argumentative 
‘coerciveness’ (since it de facto-if not 
formally-implicates early release), as 
well as a kind of default (since it 
represents a preselected by the system 
option to become a better person). 
Therefore, it may not only influence 
but also persuade the sex-offender 
(thus intruding on his autonomy), at 
least in case that his agency is not 
robust (e.g. his self-
trust/esteem/acceptance is considerably 
low). (MacKay and Robinson 2016; 
Sunstein2016; Blumenthal-Barby 
2016).The offer of surgical castration 
may take advantage of eventual sex-
offender’s predisposition towards self-
transformation, in the case that he is 
intrinsically motivated to  conform to 
social status and become a better 
person i.e. in the case of a sex-offender 
who completely rejects his passions or 
is a simple bystander of his deviant 
motives. Note, however, that non-
argumentative influences may not 
equally erode deliberation(Robichaud, 
2016).  
At any rate, nudging (or unduly 
inducing) an imprisoned sex-offender 
to consent to surgical castration raises 
ethical concerns. Decision for surgical 
castration (for moral reasons)is too 
important and programmatic decisionto 
be unreflective, namely, to result from 
reason-bypassing (unconscious) 
process. Furthermore, provided that a 
sex-offender who is locked in prison is 
most likely to be in a quasi-unhealthy 
(off-balance) state as well as in a state 
of being lowered down in respect and 
social status (and, hence, his self-
esteem is likely to be low) due to the 
mere fact of being in prison,he may be 
to a lesser extent resilient to non-
argumentative influences as compared 
with the same sex-offender who lives 
outside of prison. Offering castration 
to imprisoned sex-offenders may threat 
sex-offenders’ equality (equal 
treatment), provided that this offer is 
(formally) completely divorced from 
their punishment, thus raising concerns 
related to social justice.   
 
Present and future autonomy 
Compromising one’s autonomy for 
enhancing or restoring one’s autonomy 
in the long run, raises reasonable 
concerns. This is a recurrent 
conandruum in various fields of 
modern bioethics (i.e. genetic 
enhancement, applications of 
neurosciences, mental ill treatment, 
patent’s refusal of information) based 
on this problematic. Douglas et al 
(2013) argue that even an invalid 
consent to castration might not prevent 
the implementation of the practice 
when there are not other decisive 
countervailing reasons (as unjustified 
incarceration practices or third 
interests) in selected cases  where 
offender’s autonomy is expected to 
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increase (or restored or prevented) in 
the future or even at present. Caplan 
(2006) states that current autonomy 
may acceptably decrease to greatly 
increase in the long run (future) as 
castration is conductive to remove 
external (imprisonment) and internal 
(sexual urges overwhelming the 
thought) barriers. Even current 
autonomy may increase as offender is 
offered with an expanded number of 
alternatives.  
Nevertheless, it is crucial to bear in 
mind that even authors arguing for 
restricting (disrespect) present 
autonomy to enhance or restore 
autonomy in the future make it clear 
that they do not claim that sex-
offender’s autonomy will always be 
increased in this way (Douglas et al., 
2013).I am stubbornly reluctant to 
accept that even invalid consent of 
imprisoned sex-offenders to surgical 
castration might not prevent the 
implementation of the practice for the 
reasons I present below. 
Surgical (radical) castration may cause 
a sex-offender to want to conform 
tosocial norms. It presents him with 
much more options and, thereby, may 
expand his autonomy in the long run, 
especially in case that his overall 
motivation capacity is not expected to 
be lost because of the 
castration.However, although surgical 
castration may enhance sex-offender’s 
future autonomy, it may at the same 
time restrict it. What dimension (the 
restrictive or the expansive) dominates 
in each single case can be only be 
judged by the sex-offender himself. 
Sexual activity, relations, starting a 
family, and procreation are among the 
capabilities included in Nussbaum’s 
list of basic human capabilities that are 
necessary for a human-being to lead a 
‘minimally decent life’ (Nussbaum, 
2006; Sen, 2009). Sacrificing some of 
list’s capabilities to enhance others 
(also included in it) prerequisites a 
rigorous assessment of the special 
weight that each of them carries for a 
particular person. Such issues are so 
strictly associated to the hard core of 
one’s personality (as they are 
fundamental requirements for living in 
a minimally decent way), namely, to 
one’s internal sphere of privacy, that 
no external weights could be allowed. 
Sex-offender himself is the only person 
that could make judgments (if any) as 
to whether castration would be 
conductive to his autonomy 
enhancement and, therefore, it would 
be the better option for him. 
Exceptionally, compromising one’s 
autonomy for enhancing or restoring 
one’s autonomy in the long run, may 
be morally unproblematic only in case 
that in all likelihood and according to 
the common sense the benefits for the 
particular person are expected to be 
much greater than the burdens related 
to the restricted present autonomy. 
This may be the case in only certain 
interventions that are medical 
treatments in the strict sense of the 
term. If the individual is the only 
competent to decide whether the 
expectedly expanded personal 
autonomy will promote her overall best 
interest and well-being, a disrespect of 
the present autonomy seems 
troublesome. Otherwise, another 
person passes her values on to another 
person, and this is paternalism. In the 
case of imprisoned sex-offenders it 
may means disrespect of their moral 
agency and, in the final analysis, 
discrimination against them.   
In conclusion, there is not a 
quantitative correspondence between 
created options and removed options. 
Creation of more options does not 
necessarily mean more autonomy. It is 
crucial to bear in mind that the notion 
of autonomy is variously conceived. 
The special weight that each option 
carries (from the prospective of the 
person it concerns) is what in final 
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analysis matters for her overall 
autonomy and, particularly, for overall 
well-being and happiness of this 
person, in the sense of the term 
eudemonia of Aristotle (Aristotle, 
1999).The goal sex-offender’s surgical 
castration is not only to achieve a 
stable and coherent self, but also to be 
enabled to enjoy a stable, coherent and 
happy self. It is reasonably argued that 
orchestrizing some strengths (using 
practical wisdom) into the goal of a 
meaningful and happy life is necessary 
for obtaining eudemonia(Schwartz and 
Sharpe, 2006). Indeed, these strengths 
should not be considered separately 
and each of them should be enhanced 
to a certain extent, given the truth of 
the Aristotlean assumption that more is 
not always better (Aristotle, 
1999).Therefore, an individually 
tailored spectrum of options that 
allows the person to whom it concerns 
to cultivate and orchestrize these 
strengths is required. More options do 
not necessarily mean greater 
happiness.  
 
Surgical castration as an identity-
changing intervention 
When one’s narrative identity changes 
radically (as is the case with effective 
surgical castration), it involves not 
only one’s core characteristics but also 
one’s judgments.. When one undergoes 
identity-changing intervention, it is 
possible that their pre-operative 
judgments and evaluations differ 
substantially from their post-operative 
ones. This is what Witt calls “opposing 
judgments” (Witt, 2017). As Witt 
argues, when identity changes are 
treated equally to other side-effects 
then consent to an identity-changing 
intervention becomes troublesome. It 
does not count as an instance of valid 
informed consent that effectively 
promotes autonomy of who gives it. 
Surgical castration might be viewed as 
an identity-changing intervention. 
Indeed, as McMillan (2014) argues, if 
an individual struggles to integrate 
passions (which are important aspects 
of narrative identity) in a coherent 
concept of identity so as to live well, 
then, the removal of these passions 
may result in this concept of identity 
being revised. Indeed, the deviant 
impulses are so important for sex-
offender’s (narrative) identity that a 
person that is muddling along with 
deviant impulses is someone different 
or someone else in comparison with a 
person that is not under the influence 
of these impulses to which he is most 
likely to remain a simple bystander. 
Moreover, it is crucial to bear in mind 
that surgical castration may bring 
about changes in the sex-offender’s 
way of selfhood with regard all the 
three layers (according to Svenaeus, 
2012) selfhood:embodied selfhood, 
existential self-reflection and social-
narrative identity. Provided the high 
visibility and high quality and 
symbolic value of testicles, the loss of 
these organs may be recurrently 
experienced as an important deficit of 
self that may profoundly influence the 
castrated individual’s reflection, meta-
reflection on and reconstruction or 
otherwise handling of his revised (due 
to the removal of the deviant impulses 
and –perhaps-the related to them 
passions) narrative identity. For 
instance, the overall motivation of the 
individual who underwent surgical 
castration may be considerably 
decreased. The potential castration-
induced phenomenological effects on 
sex-offenders’ identity remain largely 
unexplored and, hence, poorly 
understood in the currently available 
literature. Further empirical research 
into the topic is needed. 
Note, besides, that surgical castration 
may bring about changes in the sex-
offender’s way of selfhood with regard 
all the three layers (according to 
Svenaeus, 2012) selfhood. Testicles 
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are organs with high visibility, quality 
and symbolic value. 
Witt (2017) argues that ‘a person 
whose identity is altered changes not 
only with regard to certain core beliefs, 
attitudes or personality traits’ but also 
‘with regard to how she evaluates or 
judges things’. Hence, such a person 
may be willing to consent to an 
identity-changing intervention from 
her ‘preintervention perspective’ 
whereas she may be unwilling to give 
consent to such an intervention from 
her ‘preintervention perspective’, and 
vice versa.  
It is raised the question whether an 
individual can give her valid and 
autonomous consent to undergo a self-
change intervention, that is to well-
balance ex ante the ratio of benefits 
and risks with regard to the post-
intervention stage.  
At any rate, surgical castration may 
have largely unexplored qualitative 
characteristics or multi-dimensional 
consequences (i.e. in the realm of self, 
identity, relations, health, and well-
being) which must be experienced to 
be fully understood. Otherwise, the 
decision-maker’s status as an 
autonomous agent may be sacrificed. 
Indeed, in certain kinds of losses 
previous personal (not vicarious) 
experience (that at least involves 
essential features of situations 
experienced before) is required in 
order for these losses to be fully 
understood. Note, for instance, that the 
desire for sex-reassignment is often 
based on thick autonomy (which is 
shaped not by but contra the   
environment of the applicant for sex-
change surgery). However, many 
transgender people who underwent 
sexual reassignment surgery are 
reported to have serious regrets and be 
potentially at considerably higher risks 
for psychiatric disorders (such as 
depression and anxiety) and suicidal 
ideation and behavior compared to 
general population (P. Fidzgibbons, 
2015). Sexual relationships are an 
important part of life provided that 
these relationships are one way to 
intimately connect and share with other 
people. Understanding sex helps one 
make more informed decisions. 
However, given the truth of the 
assumption that deviant impulses may 
cause some sex-offenders to see 
anything through the lens of these 
impulses, these individuals may poorly 
understand sex and, hence, they are 
probably unable to judge if his overall 
motivation capacity will be lost 
because of the castration or not. 
 
The status of an imprisoned sex-
offender as moral agent  
The prison may be coercive. It is 
argued that prison is not an in and of 
itself inherently coercive context so 
that detainees experience irresistible 
coercion that negates informed consent 
(Moser et al., 2004).  It is argued that 
fear of incarceration may be irrational 
(Appel, 2012) or to some extent 
unjustified (Moser et al., 2004). 
However, the conditions under which 
prisoners live vary considerably from 
setting to setting. Unjustified 
incarceration practices are probably 
more often than what is stated 
(Douglas et al., 2013). This would fact 
in when considering the perspective of 
long-term remaining  in prison in the 
process of balancing it against offered 
surgical castration, thus raising 
questions related to justice (the 
principle of equal treatment of 
criminals who committed crimes of 
equal gravity). 
In addition, imprisoned sex-offenders 
should be recognized as vulnerable 
population. Within a prison setting the 
environment may be viewed as 
unhealthy (or quasi unhealthy) through 
the lens of phenomenology. Through 
the lens of phenomenology 
Svenaeus(2011) views illness as 
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unhomelike being-in-the-world. The 
author argues that unhomelike being-
in-the-world is not a case of illness in 
itself. It is a ‘wider characterization’ 
than illness and may be caused by 
external circumstances.. However, it 
‘could, of course, lead to illness in the 
long run.’ This may be the case with a 
prisoner. As Svenaeus (2017) puts it, 
an individual who is closed in prison 
may result in unhomelike being-in-the-
world. If the detainee is able to project 
the conditions of prison in his life, he 
may adjust a homelike life in the 
prison context. Nevertheless, as 
Svenaeus (2017, p.212) states, ‘the 
conditions of imprisonment in most 
cases would offer too much resistance 
to allow this homelike reinterpretation 
of the person’s life project (especially 
if the imprisonment is for life or for a 
very long time).’A prisoner who is in 
unhomelike being-in-the-world is not 
in tune with his environment and, 
hence, he is likely to be in an off-
balance state (Svenaeus, 2011; Kayali 
and Iqbal, 2013).In all likelihood his 
state of mind is bad and this is based 
on the particular circumstances. 
The aforementioned (quasi or not) 
unhealthy state becomes probably 
more unhealthy because of the 
following assumption.  An imprisoned 
sex-offender in all likelihood feels 
guilty and intense regret for both his 
own life that went “badly awry”, and 
his long-standing deviant behavior that 
had serious other-regarding harmful to 
society consequences. Probably he has 
internalized social-rejection that in all 
likelihood is a predisposing factor for 
decreasing self-acceptance (Berg, 
Munthe-Kaas and Ross, 2016), that is 
an essential skill for developing and 
maintaining authentic self (McLeod, 
2002). Offering surgical castration 
forces sex-offenders to confront their 
own judgment regarding their own life, 
namely, their own deviant behavior 
resulted in them being in prison (a 
degrading situation, especially when 
sex-offenders are persons of high 
social status). Therefore, the eventual 
feelings of shame, guilt and regret may 
be enhanced in a quite humiliating and 
undignified context (prison), especially 
for someone with high social status. 
Imprisonment is a disintegrative 
shaming practice that results from both 
‘state-led and popular responses to sex-
offending.’ (McAlinden, 2005). 
The aforementioned quasi unhealthy 
(‘off-balance’) state may be further 
problematic for one’s decision-making 
capacity in the case of an imprisoned 
sex-offender. An imprisoned sex-
offender, especially in case that is 
someone with high social status or has 
internalized social rejection, may feel 
very ashamed and guilty as perpetrator 
of severely antisocial behavior for 
which he severely blames his 
irresistible deviant impulses that led 
him to undergo degrading treatment 
(prison). Therefore, he may feel 
overwhelmed by intrusive negative 
thoughts and feelings that probably 
take up and limit sex-offender’s 
evaluative bandwidth, namely, the 
capacity of the brain’s ability to 
perform basic functions that underlie 
both judgment and decision-making 
processes. As Schilbach et al. (2016) 
arguably state ‘we have traditionally 
viewed cognitive capacity as fixed, but 
in fact it can change with 
circumstances.’Bandwidth may be 
taxed, so that there’s less of it available 
for use in other judgment or decision-
making processes. A full-fledged brain 
bandwidth is needed for making 
difficult decisions such as to decide 
whether to undergo surgical castration 
(abrogation of body parts that have 
high intrinsic value and play a 
powerful role in one’s life plan) for the 
sake of morality (to become a “better 
person”), or not. 
Note, besides, that the here advanced 
assumption that human brain when 
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imprisoned may become a ‘prison 
brain’, has found advocates in 
academic literature.  Meijers et al. 
(2015) after having performed a 
systematic review hypothesized that 
‘the impoverished prison environment, 
depriving its population of many 
normal stimuli, may lead to (further) 
deterioration of executive functions’, 
which  are crucial for self-regulation 
(Hofmann et al., 2012) and, hence, for 
successful re-entry in society. Meijers 
et al. (2015) state that ‘executive 
functions are higher order cognitive 
functions including planning, working 
memory, taking initiatives, set-shifting, 
attention, and impulse control’, citing 
related literature (Jurado and Rosselli, 
2007; Diamond, 2013). Sex-offenders’ 
executive functions such as planning, 
taking initiatives or impulse control are 
crucial for making decision to undergo 
surgical castration in order to make 
self-transformation.  
Besides, it is to be highlighted that 
prisoner sex-offender’s authenticity 
and autonomy may be eroded by 
strong social disapproval. Although in 
our western type communities are 
characterized by individualism and 
relativism there is strong consensus 
concerning the disapproval of sex-
offending behavior (particularly when 
involving children). (McAlinden, 
2005).When such a strong social 
rejection is highly internalized (thus 
becoming internal stressor, proximal 
and strongly related to self) it may be a 
predisposing factor for decreasing self-
acceptance/esteem/trust and increasing 
self-disgust and self contempt. Sex-
offenders may judge the sources of 
rejection as in themselves. This is the 
case with internalized body shaming 
(Gilbert, Miles, 2014, 56) and 
homonegativity (Berg, Munthe-Kaas 
and Ross, 2016) and in all likelihood 
this is also the case with rejection of 
sex-offenders’ behavior. Hence, 
internalized social rejection as well as 
possibly feelings of guilty and regret 
are factors predisposing an agent (sex-
offender) into having less than robust 
moral agency (at least on the 
authenticity-based account of 
autonomy). Self-
trust/esteem/acceptance are skills that 
are essential for developing and 
maintaining authentic self and 
autonomy (McLeod, 2002). Without 
robust self-trust/esteem/acceptance the 
sex-offender’s status as an autonomous 
agent may be sacrificed. 
It is crucial to bear in mind that there 
may be various degree of discrepancy 
between actual and perceived coercion. 
Empirical studies with sex-offenders 
offered surgical castration have shown 
that coercion may be perceived to be 
less than the actual coercion (Rigg, 
2002).3 
 
The decision-making process in 
prison 
Narrative identity and values 
An imprisoned sex-offender may not 
be the same person but someone 
different (if not someone else) as 
compared to the same person living 
outside the prison, in the real world. 
The (eventually coerced and mostly 
threatening to harm detainee’s health 
and well-being) context of prison may 
have non-argumentative influence on 
him, thus nudging  or undue inducing 
or encouraging him towards placing 
considerable emphasis on particular 
emotions, values and beliefs which 
might be regarded as necessary for 
getting his life ‘back on tracks.’  
The imprisoned sex-offender probably 
struggles to cultivate new values and 
incorporate them in a coherent concept 
of identity in order to get rid of the 
components of his identity that led him 
to reduced sense of well-being. The 
process of narrative identity 
development continues across the life 
course. People should be allowed to 
change the changeable elements of 
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their narrative identity rapidly. 
Narrative identity is taken to be the 
collection of characteristics that make 
an individual distinctive, thus 
determining who they are. (DeGrazia, 
2005, 77-83).  Narrative identity is the 
internalized and evolving story of 
one’s self. This collection encompasses 
beliefs, values, preferences, attitudes, 
commitments, behavioral traits, plans 
and projects that are of central 
importance for an individual 
(Shoemaker, 2006, 41, 47). Besides, 
prison context may nudging him 
towards envisioning his future life 
differently as compared with the same 
person if he was living outside of 
prison, thus re-constructing the part of 
his narrative identity which concerns 
the future. The internalized and 
evolving story of one’s self (narrative 
identity) is a selective reconstruction of 
the autobiographical past and a 
narrative anticipation of the imagined 
future (McAdams, 2012). In case that  
a detainee sex-offender has  
substantially different narrative 
identity in comparison with the identity 
he would have if he was living outside 
the prison, in all likelihood, he would 
have made substantially different 
decisions if he was offered surgical 
castration outside of prison. The 
modern decision-making science 
highlights the role of the pattern of 
values that are closely and stably allied 
to one’s identity, which are thought of 
as playing a crucial role in decision-
making process (Hermann et al., 
2016). Values stability is necessary. 
However, this is a versatile and ill-
defined term, which needs further 
empirical research.  Holding divergent 
moral values is rarely a question of 
being unable to change them. People 
should be allowed to change their 
values, beliefs and preferences. 
However, further research is needed to 
determine whether a certain value (or a 
pattern of values) might be considered 
stable over a period of time and 
therefore constitute an element of 
one’s identity.  
 
Bandwidth, critical thought and 
judgments 
As is exhibited above, a prisoner may 
most likely to be in unhomelike being-
in-the-world, thus being not in tune 
with his environment (off-balance 
state). Moreover, prisoner’s sex-
offender brain bandwidth may be 
limited because of his eventual 
negative thoughts. An imprisoned sex-
offender, especially in case that is 
someone with high social status or has 
internalized strong social rejection, 
may feel very ashamed and guilty as 
perpetrator of severely antisocial 
behavior for which he severely blames 
his irresistible deviant impulses that 
led him to undergo degrading 
treatment (prison). Prison context 
probably reminds him of the negative 
consequences of his behavior, thus 
making stronger their eventual sense of 
guilt and awareness of the wrongness 
of their behavior that resulted in their 
life having gone badly awry.  A sex-
offender who fully rejects his deviant 
behavior considering it not integrated 
part of his own (narrative) identity and, 
hence, is highly motivated to become a 
better person, namely, is predisposed 
in accepting castration, is most likely 
to have feelings of shame and guilt as 
well as intrusive negative. Indeed, he 
may feel overwhelmed by intrusive 
negative thoughts and feelings that 
may take up and severely limit sex-
offender’s human bandwidth for 
evaluation, namely, the capacity of the 
brain’s ability to perform basic 
functions that underlie both judgment 
and decision-making processes. In 
some cases the deviant sexual urges 
might overwhelm his thoughts and 
make him seeing anything through the 
lens of irresistible impulses. This may 
also take up and severely limit sex-
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offender’s human bandwidth. The sex-
offender’s brain bandwidth may be 
taxed, so that there’s less of it available 
for use in other judgment or decision-
making processes, thus making illusory 
the line between active choosing (pro-
castration) and paternalism. A full-
fledged brain bandwidth is needed for 
making decisions such as to undergo 
surgical castration (namely, abrogation 
of body parts that have high intrinsic 
value and play a powerful role in one’s 
life plan) for the sake of morality (to 
become a “better person”). Such an 
important and programmatic decision 
should mainly be product of critical 
thought and reflective judgment. Note, 
however, that the capacity to decide 
major life issues such as surgical 
castration requires that decision-
maker’s capacity for critical reflection 
operates at the highest possible ‘level 
of sophistication’ (using the term of 
Friedman, 2003). This is not harbored 
by the conditions under which an 
imprisoned sex-offender is most likely 
to be (quasi-unhealthy / off balance 
state, overwhelmed mind).These 
conditions may affect prisoner’s 
practical thought and his ability to 
fully understand, genuinely appreciate, 
deliberate and process the provided 
information, to reflect on his inner 
storyline (narrative identity), as well as 
to balance all the relevant 
considerations before making any final 
decision on surgical castration 
acceptance or refusal. This balancing 
would include considerations such as 
those regarding the side-effects of his 
potential self-transformation that might 
reduce his local capacity e.g. to have 
sex with his wife or even his overall 
motivation capacity particularly in case 
that he places considerable emphasis 
on values such as sexuality. Note, 
besides, that it might be   extremely 
difficult for an imprisoned sex-
offender to weigh the pro and cons of 
the intervention, especially before a 
self-changing intervention (ex ante). 
Moreover, it may be extremely 
difficult for an imprisoned sex-
offender to balance surgical castration 
against early release from a long-time 
imprisonment, namely to balance two 
almost equally bad options (in case 
that castration is offered as linked to 
early release). 
Besides, the aforementioned 
conditions(quasi-unhealthy state – off 
balance state, overwhelmed mind) may 
hamper the detainee’s ability to use his 
practical wisdom (namely, the 
excellence of practical thought) to 
orchestrize (in an imaginary way) his 
strengths, values and virtues into a goal 
of good and happy life (considerably 
transformed), namely, a goal that 
deserves to be obtained by means of 
surgical castration. Note, besides, that 
decision-making capacity is neither a 
permanent condition nor an ‘all or 
nothing’ concept, namely, a patient 
may be competent to make certain 
decisions but not others (Ganzini et al., 
2005). 
Attention and introspection  
Moreover, the off-balance state of a 
detainee sex-offender who, in addition, 
may have limited human brain 
bandwidth, may affect his attention. 
Underlying attentional biases 
(predisposition towards paying more 
attention to process certain types of 
information)may result in awareness 
deficit (neglect) (Graziano and Kastner 
2011).Therefore, off-balanced 
prisoners may be less capable of using 
emotion intelligence (which may 
already lack in sex-offenders, Sharma 
et al., 2015) or keeping focus on (more 
or less coherent) values that are stably 
over time and closely allied to their 
(internally constructed) identity 
throughout the decision-making 
process, and of being activated and 
fully engaged in their own decision-
making processes, with their values, 
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beliefs, preferences and emotions. 
Thus, their identity-handling capacity 
fall short and their decision-making 
processes are lacking or more prone to 
abuses. 
 
The coercion of making choice 
We should not underestimate the 
strength of coercion resulting from 
requiring sex-offenders to decide 
whether to undergo radical (surgical) 
castration or not. This coercion may be 
of considerable strength when an 
imprisoned sex-offender is required to 
choose between surgical castration and 
early release from prison. At any rate, s 
sex-offender who is offered surgical 
castration is faced with the necessity of 
making a programmatic and 
considerably important decision which 
involves the thinking of his own 
(surgically) castrated body.  Forcing 
sex-offenders to decide whether to 
undergo surgical castration or not may 
lead to fewer autonomous decisions, in 
analogy with forcing prospective organ 
donors to think of their own death 
(Zuradzki and Marchewka, 2016).  It 
may lead to making an adverse 
decision. This forcing may cause stress 
that may limit the cognitive processes, 
thereby affecting basic decision-
making capacities. Under that stress, a 
decision-maker may search through all 
the available alternatives without 
thinking deeply about them (Janis and 
Mann 1977). Social psychologists and 
philosophers Gerald Dworkin of 1982) 
have noticed many important costs 
related to the mere necessity of making 
a choice: acquiring and processing new 
information; psychological pressure 
stemming from the necessity of 
making a decision; possible regrets 
after making a decision;  
Starcke and Brand (2016) argue that 
individuals who experience stress 
make less beneficial and more risky 
decisions than individuals who remain 
unstressed. The authors hypothesize 
that it is due to ‘alterations of 
dopamine firing rates and reduces 
executive control by hindering optimal 
prefrontal cortex functioning.’ 
Emotions and affective responses  
The imprisonment may favor sub-
optimal decision-making processes for 
additional to being in off-balanced 
state reasons.  Imprisonment and its 
consequences (isolation, deprivation of 
freedom, eventually unjust practices or 
coercion) may cause sex-offenders to 
have affective responses to their 
previous behavior that may influence 
decisions regarding whether or not to 
repeat the behavior (Kahneman et al., 
1993). However, these affective 
responses may be (both qualitatively 
and quantitatively) different from those 
the same sex-offender would have if he 
were living outside prison, namely, in 
the real world. Hence, a pro-castration 
decision may be facilitated. Besides, it 
is crucial to bear in mind that emotions 
may negatively affect decision-making 
capacity because may negatively affect 
responsiveness to evidence, epistemic 
beliefs or perception of reality 
(Hermann et al., 2016). Besides, in 
terms of the classical approach, 
emotions may negatively affect the 
appreciation criteria of decision-
making capacity (Hermann et al., 
2016). Finally, as some sex-offenders 
may lack affective empathy for his 
potential victims, they may have not 
adequately developed emotions and, 
hence, they lack decision-making 
capacity. This needs further empirical 
research. 
 
The role of the psychiatrist 
Although some jurisdictions offer 
surgical castration to sex-offenders, 
they attribute minimal or not at all role 
to psychiatrist. Apparently, these 
jurisdictions disrespect detainee sex-
offenders as moral agents and therefore 
they apparently take an ethically 
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implausible stance. Nonetheless, even 
if psychiatrist has a predominant role, 
this does not in any case guarantee the 
ethicality of surgical castration. 
Psychiatrist is the long hand of the 
state as having de jure and de facto 
authority. Therefore, even if state 
covers its subtle pro-castration 
intention, it may become apparent 
through the way that a psychiatrist 
presents the offer applying the relative 
regulation. In addition, I am 
profoundly uncomfortable with the 
assumption that a psychiatrist can 
always perform his or her demanding 
task satisfactorily, particularly in the 
fields of providing information and 
establishing sex-offender’s decision-
making competence.  
The psychiatrist--offender encounter 
and communication most assuredly 
would be permeated by personal biases 
of the former. When psychiatrist 
presents surgical castration to sex-
offenders, there are reasons for 
communication shortcomings in 
addition to those concerning physician-
patient encounters. Living in a society 
that is too strong in its disapproval of 
sex-offending (especially when 
involving children) (McAlinden, 
2005), psychiatrist can be thought of as 
being potentially biased towards sex-
offenders. Therefore, he is most likely 
to unwittingly introduce his 
preconceptions (based on his/her 
personal experiences and 
understanding of the world, values, 
culture, political leanings, gender, age, 
religion etc) in his relationship with 
sex-offender, thereby wittingly or 
unwittingly getting him to opt for 
castration. The psychiatrist may 
argumentatively or non-
argumentatively influence the sex-
offenders decision-making process, 
thus nudging him into accepting the 
offered castration. As psychiatrist’s 
potential biases are deeply ingrained in 
society there is no means that enable a 
psychiatrist to reduce these personal 
biases unless the process of reflecting 
on himself (a kind of reflexivity) 
throughout the entire procedure,  to 
provide more effective and impartial 
relationship with offenders. However, 
it is extremely difficult task to remain 
an objective observer and assessor.  
Interestingly, in order for an assessor 
(i.e. psychiatrist) to understand the 
propositional attitudes of a decision-
maker, he or she necessarily fit them 
(to a greater or lesser extent) into her 
own value judgment scheme, thereby 
making “intrapersonal comparison of 
value judgments” that are “inherent in 
the very activity of interpretation” 
(Davidson, 2004). If such intrapersonal 
comparisons are necessarily made 
when attributing propositional attitudes 
like beliefs, desires and preferences to 
another person, this is particularly the 
case when attributing propositional 
attitudes to a repeat sex-offender 
(especially pedophile) while 
interpreting his narration. Sexual 
offending is a sensitive issue that 
causes strong social reaction which 
may have profoundly shaped values 
that are component parts of 
psychiatrist’s narrative identity.  In 
constructing their narrative identities 
‘people draw heavily on prevailing 
cultural norms and the images, 
metaphors, and themes that run 
through the many narratives they 
encounter in social life.’ (McAdams, 
2011). Therefore, the psychiatrist may 
also be reluctant to go to great pains to 
play a role as a guarantor of the sex-
offender’s status as moral agent. That 
is to say that the psychiatrist may be 
wittingly or unwittingly reluctant a) to 
provide full information, b) to go 
beyond information, namely, to 
empower and activate the sex-offender 
to insight his situation and become 
fully engaged in their decision-making 
process according to his values, 
preferences and emotions, c) to 
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investigate whether the particular sex-
offender has robust agency and 
decision-making capacity, and d) to 
investigate whether the particular sex-
offender is strongly and 
wholeheartedly motivated to become a 
better person, namely, to obtain his 
self-transformation.4 
Another task of the psychiatrist is to 
establish whether self-transformation is 
the operant reason for seeking surgical 
castration. According to McMillan 
(2014) the possibility of early release 
and its link to the offered surgical 
castration should be intended by 
psychiatrist not to be the operant 
reason for the sex-offender’s consent 
to castration. Even if such a hope is not 
operant reason for requesting 
castration, it may be a secondary 
reason. Self-transformation should be 
the operant reason for seeking ethically 
plausible surgical castration. McMillan 
(2014) himself considers such a 
secondary reason innocuous for 
castration’s ethicality. He states that 
“…this does not imply that…the 
potential implications of that for being 
released early will play no role in the 
sex offender’s reasons for wanting to 
be castrated…”.However, particularly 
when a long-term (perhaps indefinite) 
incarceration (or re-incarceration) 
enters into account, the imperative 
necessity for early release (from 
prison’s environment that-as elsewhere 
in this paper is anticipated-may be 
coercive or most likely threatening to 
harm detainee’s health) may 
unwittingly masquerade as strong 
autonomous desire for self-
transformation. Elsewhere in this paper 
is anticipated that surgical castration 
may factor in as de facto alternative to 
further imprisonment. Consequently, 
the line between operant reason and 
secondary reason (implications 
“playing a role in reasons”) may be 
illusory and, hence, the line of 
distinction between active choosing 
(pro-castration) and paternalism may 
become blurry.  
The line of distinction between 
“operant reason” and implications 
“playing a role in reasons” may be 
blurry and, hence, the diagnosis of the 
real operant reason may be extremely 
difficult.  
For the reasons mentioned above, 
psychiatrists must be fully engaged in 
their work. They must keep their mind 
in a positive state that is appropriate to 
meet the demands of their (indeed 
demanding) task. 
It is crucial to bear in mind the 
following consideration. From a 
traditionalist standpoint, there are 
Hippocratic professional values that 
related to the core purpose of 
medicine, which long precede the 
modern medical ethics and are so 
deeply ingrained in medical tradition. 
The psychiatrist may show ‘intuitive 
medical response’ (Sommerville, 
2003) against a radical intervention 
(surgical castration) that is not clearly 
medical treatment but occupies the 
intersection between punishment and 
treatment. Therefore, the psychiatrist 
may be intuitively predisposed to limit 
his ‘hands-on’ involvement in 
‘fundamentally wrong and 
counterintuitive for the profession’ 
(Sommerville, 2003) activities such as 
to offer surgical castration to detainee 
sex-offenders and then assess his 
desire and informed consent process. 
This may result in psychiatrist playing 
inappropriately and unsuccessfully his 
or her role which involves, above all, 
the acting as a guarantor of sex-
offender’s status as moral agent. 
Besides, psychiatrist may not 
sufficiently act as a guarantor of sex-
offender’s agency for the following 
reason: Provided that imprisoned sex-
offenders come from various 
educational backgrounds, work-related 
stress responses (such as ‘secondary 
traumatic stress, compassion fatigue, 
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vicarious traumatization and burnout’) 
may occur among psychiatrists who 
work with sex-offenders (Hardeberg 
and Demuth, 2018). These responses 
may negatively influence the 
effectiveness of psychiatrist-sex-
offender relationship in promoting the 
autonomy of the latter.  
 
The effectiveness of surgical 
castration  
If surgical castration is not effective, it 
is not treatment but punishment.  The 
effectiveness of surgical castration 
presupposes causal relationship 
between sexual hormones and deviant 
(offensive) behavior, as well as sex-
offender’s strong desire for self-
transformation. The effectiveness of 
surgical castration requires not only 
sex-offender’s autonomous consent, 
but his strong request based on strong 
self-motivation to become a better 
person.  
There is no robust data indicating clear 
causal relationship between 
testosterone levels and sexual 
offending (Lee and Cho, 2013; Wong 
and Gravel, 2018).A causal 
relationship between testosterone 
blood levels and deviant sexual urges 
and behavior cannot be indisputably 
established in any case.  Besides, a 
range of negative side-effects are 
related to surgical castration. A range 
of authors found in  surgically 
castrated sex-offenders low (2,5-
7,5%)(Weinberger et al, 2005)  or less 
low (Douglas et al, 2013)recidivism 
rates  after compared to recidivism 
rates of 50% (Lee and Cho, 2013) or 
60-84% (Weinberger et al, 2005)  in 
untreated sex-offenders. Indeed, a 
particular sex-offender’s deviant 
behavior may be caused by 
hypersexual urges, at the origin of 
which, however, may be 
neurobiological determinants.  
However, this is not always the case. 
Although relevant neurobiology-based 
evidence may be provided, it would 
currently be both questionable and 
problematic to wholly establish or 
wholly exclude a causal relationship 
between neurobiology and a particular 
sex-offender’s deviant behavior so that 
he can be fully or partially excused 
from criminal responsibility (a concept 
that philosophically is conceived 
variously). For instance, in 
developmental pedophilia, the causal 
relationship between pedophilia and 
neurobiology becomes problematic 
because of methodological 
shortcomings and variances of the 
concept pedophilia (Gilbert and 
Focquaert, 2015).Note, besides, that 
pedophilia is a multi-factorial and 
multi-dimensional concept with 
overlapping classifications (Gilbert and 
Focquaert, 2015).At any rate, when the 
risk of future sex-offending is 
highlighted (i.e. when balancing 
further imprisonment against surgical 
castration) more emphasis should be 
placed on the link between deviant 
behavior and mental disorder. 
Unfortunately, forensic clinicians often 
assess the ‘risk for future sexual 
violence based on actuarial scores 
rather than characteristics and features 
of the mental condition.’ (Weinberger 
et al., 2018). 
Gilbert and Focquaert (2015) argue 
that individuals with acquired 
pedophilia may have compromised 
executive capacity although they may 
secure their moral capacity. The 
executive capacity of such an 
individual ranges along a continuum in 
the between two extremes: full 
executive capacity and complete 
deficiency of it. Sex-offenders with 
non insignificant executive capacity 
who retain their moral capacity 
probably should be encouraged to be 
treated without surgical castration. At 
any rate, as Weinberger et al. (2005) 
state ‘orchiectomy may have a role in 
risk assessments; however, other 
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variables should be considered, 
particularly as the effects can be 
reversed by replacement testosterone.’ 
In order to be eligible for effective 
castration a  sex-offender must 
strongly, wholeheartedly and stably 
over time reject his deviant passions 
and craves after an opportunity for 
self-transformation. His overall 
motivation should not be expected to 
considerably decrease. Therefore, a 
previous rigorous psychological 
scrutiny is necessary. It is recently 
stated that Fred Berlin, founder of the 
sexual disorders clinic at Johns 
Hopkins University warns that 
‘castration is not a quick fix and 
doesn't work for everyone’ (Sealey, 
2018).   
 
Conclusion 
This paper challenges all the three 
points proposed by McMillan as 
determining the ethicality of sex-
offenders surgical castration, as well as 
the argument that compromising one’s 
autonomy for enhancing or restoring it 
in the long run can justify the non-
consensual surgical castration. A sex-
offender who is locked in prison in all 
likelihood is in an unhealthy (or quasi 
unhealthy) off balance state (from a 
phenomenological standpoint) and 
possibly he has limited human 
bandwidth and low self-esteem. The 
coercive character of prison cannot be 
ruled out. The decision for surgical 
castration is a programmatic decision 
for self-transformation by means of 
abrogating a highly valuable part of 
human body (for moral reasons). 
Besides, surgical castration is a radical 
and quasi identity-changing 
intervention that leads to a situation the 
essential features of which the person 
who request it has never experienced 
before. The paper focuses mostly on 
defending sex-offender’s status as 
moral agent as well as his de facto 
decision-making capacity. It discusses 
the possible ways in which sex 
offenders could be unduly induced or 
nudged into consent to offered 
castration and whether this is a 
decisive moral problem. Offering 
surgical castration to imprisoned sex-
offenders is vaguely positioned 
between treatment and punishment. 
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Footnotes 
1Surgical castration if applied, should 
be not indiscriminately but carefully 
applied to a narrow group of repeat 
sex-offenders who accept the 
treatment. For instance, surgical 
castration might be expected to take 
the impulse away from those who are 
sexually aroused by their crime (i.e. 
sadists or pedophiles). For more details 
see Gawande, A. (1997). The 
Unkindest Cut. The Science and Ethics 
of Castration. Slate. 11 July 1997. 
Web. 09 October 2011. (Cited in 
Harrison K. (2008). The Castration 
Cure, In Prison Service Journal 175, 
13-15.). Available 
from:http://www.slate.com/articles/hea
lth_and_science/medical_examiner/19
97/07/the_unkindest_cut.html (last 
access: 13 Sept 2018). 
2 He also illustrates it through reference 
to a case study the possibility of a sex-
offender’s self-transformation obtained 
through surgical castration. Mr T is 
reported as effectively treated through 
voluntary surgical castration. Note, 
however, that the case of Mr T is an 
isolated one in the relevant literature 
and, hence, it currently neither 
dramatically exemplifies the 
effectiveness of sex-offenders surgical 
castration nor fully addresses the 
concerns about the respect of detainee 
sex-offenders as moral agents.  
3 Note, however, that even under 
coercive circumstances choices can be 
made rationally and voluntarily, that is 
to say, autonomously (Rosati, 1994; 
Meyers, 2007). Certainly, under 
coercive circumstances an autonomous 
and competent agent can give 
normatively valid consent as long as 
formal criteria for informed consent 
are met (Bomann-Larsen, 2013). 
Nevertheless, normatively valid 
consent should not be considered 
adequate when it comes to a 
programmatic decision involving the 
abrogation of a highly valuable bodily 
part for moral reasons (non-medical 
reasons in the strict / traditional sense 
of the term). Therefore, the rigorous 
scrutiny of everyone component of 
decision-maker’s agency and decision-
making process is necessary.  
4 Recent study published in American 
Journal of Bioethics (Ubel et al., 2017) 
showed that doctors, although went to 
great pains to the contrary, they (rather 
unwittingly) fail to provide to patients 
clear, concise and unbiased 
information. Besides, they fail to 
activate patients and keep their patients 
actively engaged in their decision 
making-process. More precisely, they 
do not achieve to involve their values, 
preferences and emotions in it. As 
emerged from the aforementioned 
study, in patient communication 
shortcomings were included coercive 
language (including body language) 
used by physicians and lack of the use 
of communicational techniques to 
verify that patient appreciated the 
provided information. Physicians have 
received inadequate training in 
communication skills.  If this is the 
case with regard to physician-patient 
encounter, namely, the findings of the 
aforementioned study can be 
generalized, the communication 
shortcomings would be expected to 
occur to a greater extent when it comes 
to psychiatrist-detainee offender 
encounter for the reasons anticipated 
above. Given that a) inadequate 
information is often provided in many 
areas of the modern clinical 
(traditionally understood) context, and 
that b) the consent to abrogation of a 
highly valuable part of human body for 
non-medical reasons (traditionally 
understood) should be fully informed, 
it is most likely that when  sex-
offenders are considering the option of  
undergoing surgical castration remain 
inadequately informed. Empirical 
studies have shown inadequacy of 
information provided to sex-offenders 
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who had undergone surgical castration (European CPT, 2009).
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